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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In almost all aspects of social life government intervention seems much more 
pervasive and intrusive today than ever before—at least in many of the Western 
countries.  Governments seem year by year to consume still more resources and to 
regulate the details of the actions and interactions of their citizens still further. 
As such the development might easily be seen as an expression of the dangers, 
which the Nobel Prize winning giant of the Austrian School of Economics, F.A. 
Hayek (1899-1992), warned against in his famous classic, The Road to Serfdom (Hayek 
[1944] 1976; cf. Hayek [1973] 1982, II: 120).  Here Hayek in essence argued that 
intervention in one area may lead to intervention in more areas, and intervention 
beyond a certain point may lead to total planning of everything: 
 
“It is sometimes said … that there is no reason why the planner should determine the 
incomes of individuals. The social and political difficulties involved in deciding the 
shares of different people in the national income are so obvious that even the most 
inveterate planner may well hesitate before he charges any authority with this task. … 
[But we] have already seen that the close interdependence of all economic 
phenomena makes it difficult to stop planning just where we wish and that, once the 
free working of the market is impeded beyond a certain degree, the planner will be 
forced to extend his controls until they become all comprehensive. These economic 
considerations, which explain why it is impossible to stop deliberate control just where 
we should wish, are strongly reinforced by certain social or political tendencies whose 
strength makes itself increasingly felt as planning extends. 
Once it becomes increasingly true, and is generally recognized, that the position of 
the individual is determined not by impersonal forces, not as a result of the 
competitive effort of many, but by the deliberate decision of authority, the attitude of 
the people toward their position in the social order necessarily changes. There will 
always exist inequalities which will appear unjust to those who suffer from them, 
disappointments which will appear unmerited, and strokes of misfortune which those 
hit have not deserved. But when these things occur in a society which is consciously 
directed, the way in which people will react will be very different from what it is when 
they are nobody's conscious choice. … 
While people will submit to suffering which may hit anyone, they will not so easily 
submit to suffering which is the result of the decision of authority. It may be bad to be 
just a cog in an impersonal machine; but it is infinitely worse if we can no longer leave 
it, if we are tied to our place and to the superiors who have been chosen for us. 
Dissatisfaction of everybody with his lot will inevitably grow with the consciousness 
that it is the result of deliberate human decision. 
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Once government has embarked upon planning for the sake of justice, it cannot 
refuse responsibility for anybody’s fate or position. In a planned society we shall all 
know that we are better or worse off than others, not because of circumstances which 
nobody controls, and which it is impossible to foresee with certainty, but because 
some authority wills it. 
And all our efforts directed toward improving our position will have to aim, not at 
foreseeing and preparing as well as we can for the circumstances over which we have 
no control, but at influencing in our favor the authority which has all the power. The 
nightmare of English nineteenth-century political thinkers, the state in which "no 
avenue to wealth and honor would exist save through the government," would be 
realized in a completeness which they never imagined-though familiar enough in some 
countries which have since passed to totalitarianism. … 
There will be no economic or social questions that would not be political questions 
in the sense that their solution will depend exclusively on who wields the coercive 
power, on whose are the views that will prevail on all occasions.”. (Hayek [1944] 1976: 
105ff). 
 
While Hayek’s exposition of this analysis was path-breaking and eye-opening to 
many people, he was in reality only making an application of a logic, he had been 
taught by his mentor, fellow Austrian School giant, Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973), 
in the 1920s. Mises’ analysis was begun as early as in 1912 with Theory of Money and 
Credit (Mises [1912] 1971), it was later developed in his critiques of socialist planning 
(e.g., Mises [1922] 1981), and is set out in detail in a number of shorter works (Mises 
[1929] 1996; Mises [1940] 1998); Mises [1950] 1991), and in his magnum opus, 
Human Action, Mises explicitly and systematically integrated his analysis of the 
dynamic character of government intervention with his more fundamental logic of 
human action, the socialist calculation problem, property rights, etc. (Mises [1949] 
1966: Ch. XXXVI).1  This research paradigm, its promises, problems and 
potential—is the topic of the present collection of essays. 
 
 
2. THE MISES-HAYEK POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF 
INTERVENTION 
 
The essence of the insights making up the core of the analysis of interventionism 
formulated by Mises and Hayek may be summarized as the view that every 
government activity necessarily constitutes an intervention, i.e., an act whereby 
resources (in the broadest possible sense) through the coercive intervention of the 
government are reallocated relative to what would have been the outcome if human 
beings had been allowed to interact freely, and where this intervention results in 
welfare losses for at least some of the parties involved and potentially for all.2 
However, what makes this process dynamic is the further insight that when such 
an intervention takes place the disturbance in the forces of supply and demand will 
lead to problems, which the decision-makers will subsequently have to address.  In 
essence, they are then confronted with a new choice: To repeal the original 
intervention or to introduce further interventions.  If they repeal the original 
intervention, they may recreate the market solution, but if they instead decide to 
intervene still further, it will only be a question of time before new, negative 
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consequences of the new intervention manifest themselves—at which point they 
will be facing a replay of the previous choice. 
Yet if the decision-makers consistently choose to intervene still further rather 
than to repeal the interventions creating the welfare losses in the first place, they will 
produce a still more government controlled society—a Zwangswirtschaft.  To 
paraphrase Adam Smith’s description of the beneficial outcomes of the market 
process—but here with a quite different conclusion—decision-makers are now led 
as if by an invisible hand to an end that might not itself have been part of their 
intention, i.e., they are led down the road to serfdom. 
Any attempt at creating a “middle of the road” between a pure free market 
economy and a completely planned economy must, according to Mises and Hayek, 
ultimately fail, because such a condition cannot itself remain stable: The problems 
created by the original interventions will continuously create disturbances in the 
markets and necessitate still new decisions on what to do and will tend to generate 
still more intervention (Mises [1929] 1996: 54; Mises [1949] 1966: 858f; Mises [1950] 
1991; cf. Burton 1984; Kurrild-Klitgaard 1990).  The interventions made by the 
government simply cannot achieve the goals set; quite on the contrary they will 
worsen the situation, which will lead to further interventions, etc., and eventually 
these choices will lead to a totally government run economy—or alternatively have 
to be abandoned.  Mises took this perspective to its ultimate conclusion: “There is 
no other choice: government either abstains from limited interference with the 
market forces, or it assumes total control over production and distribution. Either 
capitalism or socialism; there is no middle of the road” (Mises [1929] 1996: 9; 
emphasis added). 
As such any attempt at a system of middle-of-the-road interventionism will not 
be a very successful one: 
 
“[The] universal struggle against competition promises to produce in the first instance 
something in many respects even worse, a state of affairs which can satisfy neither 
planners nor liberals …  By destroying competition in industry after industry, this 
policy puts the consumer at the mercy of the joint monopolist action of capitalists and 
workers in the best organized industries.  Yet, although this is a state of affairs which 
in wide fields has already existed for some time, and although much of the muddled 
(and most of the interested) agitation for planning aims at it, it is not a state which is likely 
to persist or can be rationally justified.  Such independent planning by industrial 
monopolies would, in fact, produce effects opposite to those at which the argument 
for planning aims.  Once this stage is reached, the only alternative to a return to 
competition is the control of the monopolies by the state—a control which, if it is to 
be made effective, must become progressively more complete and more detailed.  It is 
this stage we are rapidly approaching. … If we are … rapidly moving toward such a 
state [of centralized planning], this is largely because most people still believe that it is 
[sic] must be possible to find some middle way between ‘atomistic’ competition and 
central direction.  Nothing, indeed, seems at first more plausible, or is more likely to 
appeal to reasonable people, than the idea that our goal must be neither the extreme 
decentralization of free competition not the complete centralization of a single plan 
but some judicious mixture of the two methods.  Yet mere common sense proves a 
treacherous guide in this field.  Although competition can bear some mixture of 
regulation, it cannot be combined with planning to any extent we like without ceasing 
to operate as an effective guide to production. …  Both competition and central 
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direction become poor and inefficient tools if they are incomplete; they are alternative 
principles used to solve the same problem, and a mixture of the two means that neither will really 
work and that the result will be worse than if either system had been consistently relied upon.” 
(Hayek [1944] 1976: 41f; emphasis added) 
 
 
3. THREE CHALLENGES FOR THE MISES-HAYEK ANALYSIS 
 
So, given the Mises-Hayek analysis are we on the way to Leviathan?  And are 
societies and economies therefore going to pieces?  Or are we, quite on the 
contrary—and as some critics of “globalization” and “neo-liberalism” might 
claim—solidly on the way to a capitalist economy and a minimal state? 
The latter would certainly seem not to be the case.  But neither would it seem to 
be altogether clear that the former is the case.  For while the scope of government 
intervention in terms of potential interference has been extended in many countries, 
not all of them have experienced a steady de facto expansion of government in all 
areas—and some not in very many areas.  Some countries, most notably the former 
socialist states in Eastern Europe, have indeed even witnessed dramatic declines in 
government intervention since 1989—and yet not really realized completely free 
markets.  In fact, for many Western countries the over-all picture of recent decades 
would seem to be one of increasing regulation in some areas, some decrease in 
regulation in other areas, and with total taxes more or less stabilizing, albeit perhaps 
at relatively higher levels than in previous decades. 
To illustrate this we may consider the changes in actual government intervention 
in the economies of the world in recent decades as measured by the extent of 
economic freedom, analyzed by the Fraser Institute and its collaborators in the 
Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney, Lawson and Gartzke 2005).  
Figure 1 exhibits the development in over-all economic freedom in the countries 
rated in the index since 1970 on a scale from 0 to 10.  The figure, which gives 
graphs for both the average index values for all rated countries and for only OECD 
countries, shows an over-all decrease in economic freedom (and hence increase in 
government intervention) in the 1970s and early 1980s, after which the average 
index values for the rated countries have risen and stabilized. 
However, these average index values cover quite different countries, which may 
have experienced quite different changes over the period.  So, alternatively we may 
consider just a single country, such as done in Figure 2, which displays the index 
values over time of the seven main areas covered by the Economic Freedom of the 
World Index as well as the over-all index value, but here only for the case of one 
country (Denmark).  As is evident, the individual policies have changed significantly 
over the period: In some areas government intervention has become more pervasive 
(public sector size and regulation of businesses); in other areas, it has become much 
less so (monetary and trade policies, etc.), and in yet other areas there have been 
minor changes during the period but with no over-all changes (e.g. regulation of 
labor markets).  The over-all picture is one of increasing over-all economic freedom, 
even if, e.g., the tax burden has increased.3  
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Either way, the general picture seems to be that both individual countries and a 
large number of countries on average may display the same pattern: interventionist 
economies, where governments often intervenes, some times more and some times 
less, depending on the areas.  There is no consistent march towards either serfdom 
or freedom, at least not over the last 30-35 years. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.Changes in averages, Economic Freedom of the World index, all countries and OECD 
countries, 1970-2003. 
 
 
 
 6 
 
Figure 2. Changes in components of Economic Freedom of the World index, Denmark, 1970-
2003. 
 
 
Now, disregarding the possible issue that the index may be fundamentally flawed, 
these two figures alone suggest that there are issues which the analysis of 
interventionism needs to address.  Why have there been changes up and down in 
the over-all extent of economic freedom (rather than uniform tendencies)?  That is, 
what drives such changes, and why have the countries of the world not gone either 
all the way down the road to serfdom or all the way up the road to freedom? 
As for the second part of the Mises-Hayek claim—that the consequences of such 
an interventionist regime will be unattractive—it is less obvious that the 
interventionist regimes necessarily do extremely poorly.  While the consequences of 
government intervention are far from as positive as envisioned by the most 
optimistic champions of such policies, and while government intervention indeed 
seems empirically over-all to be hurtful to growth and prosperity (cf., e.g., Scully 
2001; Holcombe 2001; Berggren 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard and Berggren 2004), we 
should simultaneously acknowledge that the problems facing many modern 
societies, even the more regulated and taxed ones, are not necessarily as obviously 
frightening as what Mises and Hayek feared.  A lot of countries could be doing 
much better in terms of the living standards of their citizens, but quite clearly many 
could also be doing much worse.  Yet Mises, for example, spoke of how  
 
“The interventionist policies as practiced for many decades by all governments of the 
capitalistic West have brought about all those effects which the economists predicted. 
There are wars and civil wars, ruthless oppression of the masses by clusters of self-
appointed dictators, economic depressions, mass unemployment, capital 
consumption, famines.” (Mises [1949] 1966: 855) 
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Such phenomena have indeed occasionally occurred, not least in Mises’ own time, 
but they are not the general picture of, e.g., those many Western countries which 
have regimes that in almost every way are considerably more interventionist than 
they were, when Mises and Hayek warned that the middle-of-the-road was 
untenable and that these states were on the road to serfdom.  So while there is a 
well-established association between economic freedom and economic growth and 
prosperity, we should at least be somewhat puzzled when we observe that many 
interventionist countries seem to be doing comparatively fine.  Even the most 
obvious of all types of government activity—i.e. the size of the public sector as 
such—does not seem to have significant, visible harmful (or beneficial) 
consequences with regard to economic growth (cf. Gordon and Wang 2004).  In 
other words, a little intervention here and there, while harmful, may not necessarily 
kill the goose that lays the eggs. 
On the other hand, if the consequences indeed occasionally or for longer periods 
seem to be too negative, then we have, what Ikeda has called the “Misesian 
paradox”, e.g., in his contribution to this volume: If “interventionism is, as Mises 
describes it, illogical, unworkable, unsuitable, self-defeating, and contradictory …, 
why is it the most widespread and persistent politico-economic system in the 
world?” (cf. Ikeda 1997: 46). 
 
There are, arguably, three problems confronting the application of the Mises-Hayek 
insights.  The first is that there seems to be an aspect of almost determinism to it—
or at least a sort of binary quasi-determinism.  In certain passages of Mises and 
Hayek it seems specifically to sound as if there really are two and only two 
possibilities at each “decision node”—to intervene or not to intervene—and two 
and only two possible final outcomes—either a completely free market economy or 
a completely regulated, planned economy.  Hayek, for example—in the previously 
quoted passage—seems to suggest that there is a “point of no return”, after which 
interventions necessarily will lead to a total planned economy (Hayek [1944] 1976: 
105).4  Mises almost simultaneously suggested in an almost even more deterministic 
tone exactly the opposite conclusion—that the level of interventionism as it was 
after World War II had reached an unsustainable level and would have to disappear 
altogether: “Yet the age of interventionism is reaching its end.  Interventionism has 
exhausted all its potentialities and must disappear. …  The interventionist interlude 
must come to an end because interventionism cannot lead to a permanent system of 
social organization.” (Mises [1949] 1966: 855 & 858)  Obviously, both cannot 
simultaneously and equally be true. 
Even if we accept these supposedly mutually exclusive final outcomes as ideal-
typical characterizations that may be possibilities, it should be obvious that these are 
not the only logical or empirical possibilities.  A middle-of-the-road system of 
relatively widespread intervention may perhaps lack a solid, consistent normative 
justification of its own,5 and it may seem difficult to define conceptually in a way 
which simultaneously is logical, comprehensive and empirically applicable, but 
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obviously it is not something that apriori simply cannot exist in practice—not for 
longer periods and perhaps not even without obviously catastrophic consequences.  
But maybe there is no necessity in a steadfast march either one way or another.  
There would seem to be two main arguments for this, a predominantly theoretical 
and an empirical observation combined with theoretical insights.  The theoretical 
argument is that these simply are not the only necessary alternatives in any 
meaningful sense.  If we consider the logic of the decision-making situation as it 
would look like if we displayed it in an extensive form of a game-theoretical analysis, 
then there is simply no necessity for the outcome to be either a totally free market 
economy or a Zwangswirtschaft, where everything is regulated and redistributed; there 
are numerous other options and several other scenarios.  Most fundamentally the 
political decision-makers may consider not simply either intervening or not-
intervening: Rather, they may consider a broad range of policies, ranging from total 
Marxist-style intervention and all the way to a total Rothbardian-style extinction of 
government activities in that particular area (or all areas), as well as—between these 
poles—an infinite number of other possible policy alternatives, including minor 
increases or decreases in existing interventions—and even not doing anything at all.  
At the next node in this decision-tree—to borrow a metaphor from game theory—
“nature” will be responding to whatever the decisions of the political decision 
makers were, but since we have no exact knowledge of the preferences and 
resources of the agents in the market place (or in the political market), we cannot 
apriori determine beyond the extremely general what the negative consequences will 
be—including whether or not they will be so considerable as to necessitate a further, 
future decision on whether to de-intervene or re-intervene—or not do anything at 
all.  This would indeed also seem to mirror real-world empirical experience fairly 
well.  Even when deregulation takes place, it rarely results in all government 
activities being completely abolished in that particular area, but rather in the creation 
of some new regulations simultaneous with the abolition of others. 
There is another reason why the logic may not be as straightforward as suggested 
by Mises and Hayek, namely that there conceivably may be inherent “equilibrating” 
tendencies also in the process of intervention, whereby there—so to speak—are 
upper-limits to how much may be intervened before the problems become so big 
that the decision-makers decide to loosen a bit, albeit without doing so more than 
what is necessary to keep the economy from collapsing.  This line of reasoning was 
perhaps first suggested by the British political scientist Norman P. Barry (Barry 
1984b; cf. Barry 1984a) and subsequently criticized (Gray 1984; Burton 1984).  What 
Barry suggested was, in essence, that there may be an “optimal rate of exploitation,” 
where interest groups with interests different from those demanding more 
intervention may counteract the activities of the latter through the state itself, thus 
producing a consequence different from the Hayekian “Serfdom”.6  Barry’s specific 
analysis invoked the fact that none of the western, liberal democratic market 
economies (whom Hayek was warning in 1944) have actually experienced the 
hyperinflation, which Hayek argued would be the automatic and necessary 
consequence of the policies he was criticizing. 
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To this we might add the example of the Laffer curve: the argument put forward 
by many free market economists from the 1970s and onwards that government 
revenues might actually be increased by lowering taxes and thereby stimulating the 
incentives for the market participants to engage even more in productive and 
mutually advantageous relationships—from which governments might then skim 
the cream, so to speak (Laffer 2004).  If indeed governments reacted to such 
analyses then that behaviour would be consistent with Barry’s hypothesis—thereby 
suggesting that there are variations of the “middle-of-the-road”-interventionism and 
that these may actually occasionally learn from mistakes, but only fiddle with the 
possibilities rather than fundamentally change the system. 
The bottom-line thus becomes that portraying the choices of the decision-makers 
as simple binary choices is simply not very realistic (in any sense of that word) and 
hence that the portrayal as one between complete capitalism or complete socialism 
simply does not make sense.  Furthermore, such a portrayal of the choice of the 
decision-makers almost of necessity leaves the analysis somewhat impotent when it 
comes to interpreting and explaining the events of the somewhat more complex 
empirical reality.  However, there are obvious issues which the analysis should seek 
to address.  Why is it that some times decision-makers choose to extend 
intervention and other times to repeal it (or some times to do nothing at all)?  What 
is the role of “culture” or ideology in either supporting or restricting interventionist 
decisions?  Austrian economic analysis, as it currently stands, has very little to say on 
this issue.  In contrast, academics outside the tradition—often in ignorance of the 
Mises-Hayek analysis—have highlighted some factors, which might easily be 
integrated into the analysis, most notably the asymmetric nature of the relative 
dispersion of costs and benefits among decision-makers, interest groups, etc. (Olson 
[1965] 1971; Buchanan 1979; Wilson 1980; Arnold 1990).  Together the 
observations should necessitate some second-thoughts among those fond of the 
Mises-Hayek type analysis.  In particular, it would seem that social scientists working 
in the Austrian tradition need to focus more specifically and less abstractly on how 
particular versions of interventionism may work in practice. 
 
The second problem is that there seems to be a rather poor application of the 
insights to cases of theory building or empirical applications.  Many Austrian School 
economists seem to have been quite satisfied to repeat the general points made by 
Mises and Hayek but not really to elaborate the theoretical framework.  There are 
some notable exceptions, e.g., attempts at taking the purely theoretical analysis of 
interventionism further (Rothbard [1970] 1977; Ikeda 1997), at bridging into new 
theoretical insights (e.g. Higgs 1987) and to conduct empirical applications (e.g., 
Rothbard 1963; Thornton 1991), but such attempts have generally been relatively 
few.  If the Mises-Hayek analysis of interventionism is to be a vibrant, challenging 
research program, it needs not only to re-tell its theoretical foundation but to 
develop and extend its theoretical analysis and apply this to highlighting actual 
processes of intervention.  
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The third problem is perhaps an outgrowth of these two first problems: There 
seems to be an almost non-existent interest in the Austrian theory of 
interventionism outside the rather narrow circles of self-conscious Austrian School 
economists.  This is all the more striking since there are strands of social science 
research which should seem to be naturally aligned with the Austrian analysis, first 
and foremost the application of so-called rational choice models, inspired by 
economic theories and game theory, to the field of politics.  Such analysis comes in 
many forms (Mitchell 1988), but especially the types of inquiry initiated by the 
“public choice” scholars of the “Virginia school” would seem to be potential allies 
(cf. the classic works by Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 1999; Olson [1965] 1971).7  
Many public choice scholars also focus on the essentially interventionist character of 
every single government activity (e.g. Aranson and Ordeshook 1981) and on the 
redistributive and welfare loss producing nature of such, most notably the analysis 
of “rent-seeking” spearheaded by the works of Gordon Tullock (Tullock [1967] 
2004; cf. Tullock 2005).  Some attempts at combining insights from both the Mises-
Hayek analysis and the public choice school have been made, but again the 
examples are relatively few and sporadic (e.g., Higgs 1987; DiLorenzo 1988; 
Thornton 1991; Anderson and Boettke 1993; Boettke 1995; Ikeda 2003), or 
confined to a single special issue of the Review of Austrian Economics (15:2/3, cf. 
Boettke and López 2002).  The end result is that—with the exception of Hayek’s 
more popular publication on the road to serfdom (Hayek [1944] 1976)—the Mises-
Hayek analysis of interventionism is largely unknown outside Austrian circles—even 
if it actually might have much to teach others, and perhaps even be integrated with 
the thinking of other schools of thought. 
 
 
4. THE CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Raising such questions are in the line of the editorial ambitions of this series (cf. 
Koppl, Birner and Kurrild-Klitgaard 2003 and the Editors’ Introduction to the 
present volume), and these are, generally speaking, the types of issues that have 
motivated the editors to try to collect studies such as those included here. 
The contributions of this volume span wide, both in chronology, perspectives, 
applications and conclusions, and—as in almost all edited volumes—this creates a 
certain unevenness in the collection as a whole, but roughly speaking the 
contributions to this collection of studies may be roughly divided into three parts: 
Theoretical themes; attempts at conceptual extensions or discussions of related 
subjects; empirical applications and perspectives. 
 The collection begins with an introductory essay by a scholar, who is no doubt 
his generation’s leading scholar on the Austrian theory of interventionism, the U.S. 
economist Sanford Ikeda, whose pioneering work in the field has brought back wider 
attention to the entire Mises-Hayek theory of interventionism (Ikeda 1997).  In his 
essay Ikeda seeks to introduce the historical evolution of the Mises-Hayek tradition 
of political economy and to show that it indeed is a useful framework for 
understanding the operation of the mixed economy, and specifically that with 
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updating and revision in light of more recent theoretical innovations it can be made 
even more useful still.  This—Ikeda argues—is particularly the case when it comes 
to incorporating concepts and insights from the public choice tradition; he sees the 
identities of the two research programs as distinct but complementary. 
Two contributions to this collection stand out in terms of their historical role and 
character, i.e., the two essays authored by Walter E. Grinder and John Hagel III.  These 
were both elements of a much larger research project envisioned by Grinder and 
Hagel in the mid-1970s, which resulted in a number of papers presented at academic 
conferences—these two papers at the 22-28 June, 1975 Institute for Humane 
Studies conference on Austrian economics at the University of Hartford, which was 
one of the conferences that is widely credited with having been instrumental in 
stimulating US interest in the Austrian School in the 1970s.8  However, only one of 
the papers from this project was ever published (Grinder and Hagel 1977), and the 
planned book never saw publication—and it is all the more relevant that these two 
papers finally are published.  In the first of these—presented by Hagel in 1975 and 
with him as the main author—Hagel and Grinder gives a basic introduction to the 
Austrian theory of the dynamics of interventionism, especially as seen the 
Rothbardian integration and systematization of the Mises-Hayek analysis of 
interventionism with the insights from other Austrians (Kizner, Lachmann, et al.) as 
well as classical liberal economists and sociologists such as Albert Jay Nock.  This 
allows Hagel and Grinder to address such questions as the comparative differences 
between, e.g., a system of interventionism, socialism and fascism, as well as the role 
of ideology. 
The article by the two American Austrian economists Walter Block and William 
Barnett II is a contribution along the same general line of analysis.  But they turn 
their attention to the methodological underpinnings of the Austrian analysis and 
focus on how this makes the Austrian analysis different from that of neo-classicial, 
positivist economists—including, as they see it, public choice theory and neo-
classical welfare economics, just as they try to distinguish the Austrian political 
economy from aspects of Marxist analysis. 
In his paper, the U.S. economist Bruce L. Benson focuses more narrowly on trying 
to elaborate on the analysis of interventionism, and he finds that both Austrian 
political economy and public choice theory have flaws.  But as distinct from both 
Ikeda (who thinks that Austrian political economy and public choice are distinct but 
compatible), Block and Barnett (who think that they are different and should remain 
so) and Hagel and Grinder (who for various reasons did not address the issue 
directly) he does so by explicitly calling for dropping the distinctions between the 
traditions and instead formulating an integrated Austrian-public-choice and neo-
institutional model that may include assumptions about the relationships between 
regulations, property rights security, and both market and political behavior.  He 
attempts to show this by applying the insights to the process of regulation in a 
context of rent-seeking special interest groups. 
 The next group of papers try to apply Austrian insights derived from or related to 
the theory of interventionism to selected areas within economics and politics.  In 
the second of the two 1975-papers by Hagel and Grinder—here with Grinder as the 
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primary author—the authors seek to show how the Austrian theory of 
interventionism and the Austrian theory of business cycles not only have a common 
origin in the works of Mises and Hayek in the 1920s but also may provide insights 
to each other.  The US public choice economist Roger D. Congleton in his paper raises 
the highly acute question of how governments manages (or mismanages) crises.  
The paper does not utilize the Austrian theory of interventionism directly, but rather 
seeks to introduce Hayek’s analysis of the use and subjective character of knowledge 
into a public choice model of the political economy of political decision-making in 
times of crisis—an area of research which so far has been neglected by public 
choice theorists.  Swedish political scientist Erik Moberg considers the Misesian 
question of whether the middle-of-the-road really is stable and situates his answers 
in terms of a dialogue between the Austrian School and public choice theory and 
specifically in a comparison of the latter’s analysis of the so-called median voter 
theorem. 
But what is the role of “culture” in generating particular responses to particular 
issues of public policy?  Hayek touched upon it briefly in The Road to Serfdom, but 
it is a question largely left out of consideration in the Mises-Hayek theoretical 
inquiry into the dynamics of intervention—but should it be?  These are indeed some 
of the themes originally investigated by the U.S. economist Daniel B. Klein in an 
article in Economics and Philosophy (Klein 1994); that essay has been republished here, 
but in a revised version and with a new postscript written in 2004.  Klein’s answer 
to the question is that politicians are honest—and rent-seeking; his paper may in 
some ways seem as a support for the call of some of the contributors to try to 
integrate Austrian intervention analysis and public choice theory.  In my own essay I 
try to add a different perspective to the problem of getting the right solutions—and 
reforms—to institutional arrangements.  Specifically, the essay tries to address issues 
which really originate in the public choice analysis of constitutional arrangements, 
often known as “constitutional political economy” or “constitutional economics” 
(cf. Buchanan 1987; Gwartney and Wagner 1988; Voigt 1997).  Much of this type of 
analysis relies on a type of analysis, where a problematic collective action situation is 
identified and subsequently a “contractarian” solution is posited.  The Mises-Hayek 
analysis enters the picture in the sense that it may be used to highlight why 
constitutions often are not very good at limiting government in practice: 
Government activities have a tendency to create demands for further such, and this 
will gradually erode constitutional constraints.  As such his analysis fits well as 
support for Ikeda’s conclusion that even a minimal state will be a victim to the 
dynamic tendencies of interventionism. 
The third group of papers all deal with more specific empirical aspects of the 
dynamics of interventionism—or even with very specific case studies.  US 
economist Robert Higgs, who in his modern classic, Crisis and Leviathan (Higgs 1987), 
drew on both Austrian and public choice insights in order to analyze the growth of 
government in the 20th century, here takes up a related theme, namely how to 
explain the changes in the growth of government in the late 20th century.  He 
examines this in a critical dialogue with the Austrian School and simultaneously 
demonstrates how many measures of government size fail to capture the real extent 
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of government intervention; part of this analysis concludes that societies are most 
likely to remain on the middle-of-the-road.  The U.S. economist Robert J. Bradley, Jr. 
considers the dynamics of interventionism in the U.S. energy industry, while the 
British economist, Mark Pennington, examines land use regulation in the U.K.  US 
economist Mark Thornton applies the logic to the attempts by governments to use 
“sin taxes” to prevent individuals from harming themselves, e.g., with drugs or 
alcohol, and the Swedish political scientist Rolf Höijer considers two related empirical 
examples from the paradigmatic case of the welfare state of Sweden: the 
governments’ sterilization campaigns and seat-belt campaigns.  It is shown that the 
initial introduction of government “insurance” schemes is frequently followed by 
interventions that either exclude individuals or limit how they may behave.  The 
German economic historian Oliver Volckart analyzes the interventionist character 
and structure of the Nazi state 1933-39, partly as a criticism of the public choice 
economist, Ronald Wintrobe’s analysis of bureau competition in Hitler’s Third 
Reich.  The collection finishes with a short note by Swedish political scientist Jan-
Erik Lane, who raises questions relating to the Austrians’ concept of “spontaneous 
order” as an explanatory element in the analysis of the development of the 
European Union. 
These contributions, in each their individual ways, do indicate that the Austrian 
analysis of the dynamics of interventionism is a promising research program, and 
one which may both contribute to the perspectives of other traditions as well as gain 
from the insights produced by these. 
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 NOTES 
                                              
1 Cf. Ikeda 1997 and Ikeda’s contribution to this volume. 
2 Cf. also Rothbard 1956; for a typology of the forms of intervention, see Rothbard [1970] 1977. 
3 For an analysis of this particular case, see Kurrild-Klitgaard 2005. 
4 Hayek, of course, did not embrace determinism, but merely one focusing on structural constraints, 
cf. Hayek [1944] 1976: 1-2.  However, his analysis of the seeming inevitability of interventionism 
seems to almost suggest it. 
5 Even this is somewhat debatable.  While one may disagree with every one of them (as at least the 
present author does), there is certainly nothing plainly absurd in the welfare state ideological 
recommendations of, say, a John Rawls or an Alan Gewirth (cf. Rawls 1971; Gewirth 1978). 
6 Cf. Gray 1984: 37f.  The argument seems to be potentially compatible with the Chicago School 
view of interest groups such as espoused by, e.g., Gary Becker and Donald Wittman. 
7 As so many others (e.g. Boettke and López 2002), I shall follow Dennis C. Mueller’s by now 
classic definition of “public choice” as simply meaning the economic study of non-market 
decision-making or the application of economics to political science, cf. Mueller 1976; Mueller 
2003.  With this definition it would indeed seem easy to see the Austrian theory of 
interventionism as a part of public choice, even if it is not a theory developed by or usually 
elaborated on by members of the Virginia School. 
8 For a detailed eyewitness account of this somewhat historic and star-studded conference, 
including words about the positive reception of the Hagel and Grinder papers, see Ebeling 1975. 
